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AD513284
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TO: Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM: Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.
AUTHORITY
AGO D/A ltr, 9 May 1975; AGO D/A ltr, 9 May 1975

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (31 Dec 70) FOR OT UT 703124

5 January 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army  
Support Command, Saigon, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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AVCS 30 MH

24 AUG 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command, Saigon, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-45 (R2) (U)

To: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

At: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR), Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities a. (U) Command: During the absence of the Commanding General, COL Robert A. Pearson was in command of US Army Support Command, Saigon, for the first fifteen days of this reporting period. COL John W. Gephart became Chief of Staff on 10 June.

b. (C) Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline (1) (C) Strength: The command strength at the conclusion of this quarter was 595 commissioned officers, 228 warrant officers, and 14,542 enlisted personnel.

(2) (U) Chaplain: This headquarters has initiated a monthly training conference for chaplains of this command and the Long Binh area. The sessions during this reporting period have emphasized the character guidance program, and guest speakers have been invited to help chaplains explore ways of making their role more relevant.

c. (C) Operations (1) (C) Operation Keystone Robin began on 1 July. This command is responsible for logistical support required to redeploy tactical units located in III and IV Military Regions and units of this command.

(2) (U) GE requests ranged from a high of 55 processed during May to a low of 4 during July.

(3) (U) This command was tasked to provide logistical support to

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Logistics Command, US Army Support Command, Saigon, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Southern II Military Region. From 10-24 July, SSC ran seven convoys to Bao Loc, and delivered 10,000 drums of asphalt to the 815th Engineer Battalion for its LOC program.

(a) (C) (a) (U) Support of the Cambodian operation was the most demanding activity of this command during the reporting period. It was the first multi-divisional Allied offensive during the Vietnam conflict, and represented a major challenge to Army logisticians. To meet that challenge, this command maintained a twenty-four hour operation each day. It was a tribute to the basic logistical structure that standard procedures and existing systems could absorb the additional burden without impairing the normal mission. The Cambodian operation demonstrated the impressive flexibility of the logistical system in III & IV Military Regions and revealed the high degree of responsiveness which it possesses.

(b) (U) One week prior to the beginning of the operation this headquarters dispatched maintenance personnel to provide technical assistance to tactical units which would be deployed to Cambodia. Technical inspections of wheeled and tracked vehicles in the 5th Infantry Division (ARVN) revealed numerous deficiencies, and personnel from this headquarters assisted ARVN personnel in making necessary repairs. The discovery and repair of these deficiencies prevented costly malfunctions in later tactical operations. Two maintenance inspectors also went into Cambodia to provide assistance to the 5th ARVN. In addition to providing assistance to ARVN units, this headquarters assisted in the maintenance co-ordination for the movement of the 2/34th Armor and the 2/47th Mechanized Infantry to Cambodia. Personnel from Saigon Support Command conducted on-site inspections, made preparations for contact team support, and aided in expediting parts.

(c) (U) The task of providing major sub-assemblies and parts for both ARVN and US equipment was a demanding one, and this command constantly sought the needed items in all available locations. The most single important measure in supplying tactical units with end items was an ambitious program based upon Keystone Cardinal assets. After establishing priorities and repair criteria to make Keystone assets available for use in Cambodia, the equipment was returned to use throughout May and June. The following table of tracked vehicles used to support the Cambodian operation reveals the magnitude of the task.

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AFM 300 Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Army Support Command,  
Saigon, Period Ending 31 July 1970, R/S SP4244 (R)

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Type</u>
1	M48A1, Combat Tank
1	Combat Engineer Vehicle
1	M88, Vehicle, Track, Recovery
1	M578, Light Recovery Vehicle
1	M548, Ammunition Carrier
1	M132, Flame Thrower
8	M123, Armored Personnel Carrier
20	M113, Armored Personnel Carrier
12	M113A1, Armored Personnel Carrier
1	M125, Mortar Carrier
2	M110, 8" Howitzer, S.F.
1	M42, Duster
2	AVLB, Bridge Launcher
1	M577A1, Command Vehicle

The effective utilization of Keystone assets insured that tactical operations were not compromised due to a dwindling supply of end items in the field.

(d) (U) On the eve of the Cambodian operation, this headquarters anticipated an increasing demand for final drives, transmissions, and engines. Closed Loop items were largely furnished from assets on hand, although some items had to be transhipped from Qui Nhon and Da Nang. Throughout the operation, normal procedures were able to absorb the higher consumption rates. In order to insure that repairable items were returned to the system, this headquarters issued detailed instructions and developed documentation procedures for declaring combat losses. The inability to retrieve certain Closed Loop items produced a mild burden on the system; helicopter support was often unavailable, and although some units did carry unserviceable items with them for later evacuation, much had to be destroyed in place. The following table shows the quantity of Closed Loop items issued in support of the Cambodian operation:

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Type</u>
8	M88 Engines
15	M578 Engines
45	M48A3 Final Drives
16	M48A3 Transmissions
25	M48A3 Engines
102	M113 Engines
18	D73 Engines
32	M551 Engines
30	M551 Transmissions

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command, Saigon, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFGH-65 (R2) (U)

<u>quantity</u>	<u>Type</u>
9	M158 Gun Mount
13	M107, M110 Transmissions
10	M107, M110 Engines
15	M108, M109 Engines
20	M37 Recoil Mechanisms
3	M2A4 Recoil Mechanisms
2	M6A2 Recoil Mechanisms
85	M35A2 Engines
160	M54A2, M52A2, M51A2 Engines
32	Engine, Military, Standard, 3 hp
112	Engine, Military, Standard, 6 hp
148	Engine, Military, Standard, 10 hp
219	Engine, Military, Standard, 20 hp

(e) (U) The myriad of supply transactions gave the system a thorough test, and it was repeatedly found efficient, responsive, and rapid. Requests came from II Field Force throughout the day and night, but the response was uniformly rapid. For example, in less than one and one-half hours from receipt of the request, this headquarters processed and shipped a gun-tube to the using unit. It was also necessary to test certain items before sending them to Cambodia to insure that using units would not receive unserviceable equipment. These tests revealed that some bridging materials in Depot stocks were not serviceable, and thus prevented burdening using units with them.

(f) (C) This command supported 85% of the Class V requirements of US units in Cambodia. To support these operations, Saigon Support Command had to increase its stockage objective from 71,906 STON (April) to 78,598 STON (May) and 90,000 STON (June). This headquarters coordinated the receipt of ammunition from Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Da Nang as well as from off-shore locations. During the months of May and June, Saigon Support Command received 113,000 STON of ammunition and issued 114,000 STON, the second highest issue/receipt activity for any two-month period in FY70. Throughout the operation, the two Delta ASPs, Vinh Long and Soc Trang, issued more than twice as much ammunition than in any previous month of FY70. Long Binh Ammunition Depot received more than 2000 STON daily for four consecutive days, a new record for that installation. Air shipments of Class V increased dramatically, and averaged 250 STON daily throughout May. The highest total tonnage was issued on 1 May, and included 1753.9 STON by motor transport, 250 STON by water, 241.2 STON by air, and 109.5 STON by unit pickup for a total of 2354.4 STON. Even when many of the ASPs came under attack in June, Class V support continued unabated.

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Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 10 May 1970, 1970  
Saigon, Period Ending 31 July 1970, 1970, 1970

(g) (U) Additional ton requirements were met by establishing temporary facilities at An Long, Cham Boi, and Ha Tien. An Long was resupplied by returning to Can Tho for refueling, and the same at An Long was resupplied by Y-tankers from Nha Be. Although the miniports were continuously being moved, barges were able to navigate the shallow rivers and canals to resupply them. The operation at Ha Tien was a unique one. Because the miniport could not be resupplied by road or fixed wing aircraft, this headquarters developed a system utilizing vessels and helicopters. A Y-tanker, moored off the coast of Ha Tien, discharged JP-4 into 500-gallon collapsible drums located on an adjacent floating barge. The drums were then moved by helicopter to Ha Tien and were pumped into 10,000-gallon collapsible storage tanks.

(h) (U) Transportation requirements for the Cambodian invasion placed heavy demands on Saigon Support Command's assets. Reinforced medium truck platoons were sent to both Tay Ninh and Quan Loi, and the operation at each of these points became a miniature movement control center. They were responsible for receiving transportation requests, co-ordinating convoy security, and supervising the dedicated reinforced medium truck platoons as well as assisting in the offload and turn-around of 48th Group assets. Tay Ninh and Quan Loi, formerly final destinations, became transship points, with SSC trucks moving beyond to Loc Ninh, Bo, Catua, Thien Ngan, and into Cambodia. An additional burden was placed upon this command when tactical units utilized their trucks in the rear area while requesting SSC transportation support in the forward areas, a practice which impaired the combined support capability.

(i) (U) Virtually all transportation requests were Combat Support, but unit moves continued to command priority. The nature of the operation altered the cargo mix, and ammunition became the primary commodity for line haul. Although frequently as many as 150 trucks required loads one night, a tremendous burden on 3rd Ordnance Battalion, only one convoy was delayed. To supplement normal ammunition resupply channels, this command requested an ammunition waiver at Newport to receive Class V transshipped from Cam Ranh Bay. When the waiver was refused, the cargo was received at Vung Tau, where, for two five-day periods, thirty trucks of the 48th Transportation Group cleared the cargo and transported it to Long Binh.

(j) (U) To meet the extraordinary line haul commitments, port support and local hauls were reduced by approximately 40%. The 48th Group curtailed its port and beach clearance activities and PERIL, the commercial truck contractor, reduced its role in port and beach clearance. Cargo at Newport rose from 7,000 to 30,000 STON. Immediately after the initial phase of the Cambodian operation, 48th Group returned to its port and beach clearance role, and reduced the tonnage at Newport to a more manageable 7,000 STON.



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Saigon, Period Ending 31 July 1970, HCS CSPUR-65 (R2) (U)

(k) (U) Terminal operations at Cat Lai and Cogido also reflected the basic theme which characterized this command's role in the Cambodian operation: the established structure and procedures of the logistical system enabled it to absorb a major new support requirement in a responsive and efficient manner. Although the number of ships awaiting discharge increased, the situation was brought under control by adding only one Vietnamese stevedore gang to the normal complement of three gangs per ship. In addition to off-loading record tonnage, Cat Lai also processed three Combat Essential missions to the Delta, in spite of the fact that fueling facilities were not available at Vung Tau, and vessels bound for the Delta had to refuel at Nha Be. Ten US personnel were sent from Cat Lai to Cogido to assist in ammunition discharge which increased from 150 to over 2000 SRM.

(l) (U) As Allied forces uncovered massive enemy supply caches, SSC played a major role in disposing of the captured weapons, ammunition, and materiel. SSC personnel in Cambodia rigged captured materiel for helicopter evacuation, while SSC trucks joined DISCOM assets in bringing the tons of equipment yielded by the caches to initial collection points at Quan Loi and Tay Ninh. A main collection point was established at Di An to display the spectrum of weaponry contained in the sanctuaries. Weapons and associated parts were later moved to the 79th Maintenance Battalion. By the end of the reporting period, the following weapons and ammunition had been delivered to MACV for further shipment.

## Weapons

<u>Type</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
7.62mm Assault Rifle, AK 47	1492
7.62mm SMG, PPSh41 (Type 50)	239
7.62mm LMG, Type 56, RPD	262
7.62mm HMG, Type 57	34
60mm Mortar	75
82mm Mortar	17
RPG-2 Launcher	461
RPG-7 Launcher	34
12.7mm HMG, Type 54	5
75mm RR, Type 56	37
57mm RR	18
7.5mm Rifle, MAS 36	198
7.5mm Auto Rifle	14

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## Ammunition

<u>Type</u>	<u>Quantity (Rounds)</u>
7.62mm LMG	18,480
7.62mm AM	2,462,240
7.62mm HMG	185,680
7.62mm (Pistol & SIG)	136,080
RPG 7	126
RPG 2	2,942
Mine, AT	22
Mine, Directional	4,590
Grenade, AT	1,840
Grenade, Rifle	7,640
14.5mm AA	74,166
120mm Mortar	549
60mm Mortar	3,703
82mm Mortar	4,376
12.7mm HMG	2,133,501
57mm RL	5,590
75mm RL	646
7.5mm (French)	408,320
5.56mm ball (US)	400
12 ga. shotgun shells (US)	100
Tear gas grenades (US)	20
.30 caliber ball (US)	41,340
81mm HS (US)	2,376
81mm Illum (US)	56

d. Training (a) During the reporting period, Project Buddy was expanded to include new AOS training in the fields of technical supply, electric forklift operations, harbor-master liaison and communications procedures, and 60-ton crane operations. 477 ARVN personnel began training programs during May and June, and 563 completed training during May and June.

(b) The III Military Region Instruct and Advise Team completed its training programs with ARVN DSUs in the Saigon area, and has provided assistance to units in Thu Duc as well.

## e. Organization (Inclosure 2)

f. (U) Logistics (1) Maintenance (a) Throughout the period, continued emphasis was placed on maintenance awareness within the command. Subordinate unit performance during Command Maintenance Management Inspections and results of Roadside Vehicle Spot Check inspections were

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regularly reviewed, and were a topic at regular Commanders Conferences. Additional emphasis was given to ongoing schools, and new training was initiated in two areas. The Engine Diagnostic School continued to graduate direct support mechanics better equipped to handle the diagnosis of engine replacement. Participation of support mechanics from outside this Command attests to the professionalism of the school as well as the importance being placed on maintenance awareness throughout the Military Region. Classes for refrigeration and air conditioner repairmen were continued with practical on-the-job training in a maintenance company. With this approach, practical, realistic training is combined with tangible, increased productivity. MECCI representatives conducted a school on the repair of the CBSS compressors for the M551 Sheridan, and provided special assistance and instruction concerning the 500 Amp Test Bench. Classes were conducted on installation, operation, repair, and troubleshooting by utilization of the component test bench. Classes were also presented to tactical units on the operation and installation of fire suppression kits for the M113 armored personnel carriers, and several kits were installed as a result.

(b) Progress continued on the Keystone projects, as parts continued to be received and equipment was repaired and returned to stock or released for immediate issue. Preliminary plans were made and trial procedures were tested on the processing line operations to be employed during the next Keystone exercise, Robin, which will get into full swing during the next reporting period. The backlog from previous Keystone projects was reduced, and the majority of equipment processing will be completed prior to scheduled receipt of Keystone Robin equipment. Considerable effort was devoted to movement of the equipment to designated repair facilities. Some equipment has been evacuated to COMUS, vehicles and weapons were shipped to Okinawa, and hundreds of vehicles were shipped to contractor repair facilities at Cam Ranh Bay.

(c) The gradual reduction of US troops has continued to take its toll of maintenance units. During the reporting period, the 590th Maintenance Company (Div) (DS) was reduced to zero strength when troop units in the area of operations were reduced. In addition, the 548th Light Maintenance Company was relocated from Tay Ninh to Long Binh to take advantage of available assets for in-country repair of Keystone equipment. As additional areas are turned over to ARVN, additional shifts will occur. In planning for the eventual phase-down, studies have been made for contractor operation of the entire maintenance activity on Long Binh. Contractor operation of the General Support Maintenance capability and the Transportation Motor Pool is both feasible and probable. Expanded use of contractors for such diverse equipment repair as typewriters, fuel drums, and tire retreading was accomplished during the period; the first

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Saigon, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (P)

repaired fuel drums returned to depot and the first recapped tires were processed during the month of June.

(d) Shortages of certain high usage items such as vehicle batteries, truck tires, and certain major assemblies continue to be problems; specialized problems such as contaminated hydraulic oil, barrel erosion of M-16 rifles, and transport damage to MILVAN equipment required special consideration. Full implementation of SCRAM procedures continued, and many local regulations were revised to facilitate ease with which a unit may turn in unneeded or excess equipment. As the budget squeeze continues, such economy measures will continue to receive primary consideration throughout the command.

(e) The inactivation of the First Logistical Command provided a nucleus of experienced Instruct and Advise team members who were re-assigned to the command. They were utilized in checking performance of Supply and Management activities within our supporting maintenance units. In some cases, the team completely remade unit records, inventoried, re-warehoused, and relocated entire Class IX facilities, and trained unit tech supply personnel in proper operational techniques.

(2) Services (a) Numerous engineering projects were advanced and completed during the reporting period. The 900-man cantonment project at Binh Thuy has been completed. The fire station at Newport was completed on 27 July, and construction on the railroad and bridge is now 35% complete. Engineer personnel are nearing completion of the LST Slip pier. At Cat Lai, the final fendering system on one mooring system was completed. The project to redeck and rebrace the two barge wharfs at Bien Hoa was completed by F&E on 24 July. At Long Binh, seventy-nine concrete culvert headwalls in the Ammunition Supply Depot were installed. A project at the Depot to install a trolley system for a series of hoists in the Care and Preservation building is nearing completion. Progress continued on the railroad with the addition of spurs in the 208 yard, FDC yard, and CC&S area.

(b) Field laundry locations have been reduced from eight to six with elimination of the laundries at Vung Tau and Tay Ninh. Of these six locations, three are in competition with contract laundries and process largely flatwork items (sheets, pillow cases, and mattress covers). Bath unit support was requested and received in four locations during and immediately after the Cambodian operations. The bath units were in place, and provided service within a reasonable time after receipt of the request. For FY71, nineteen laundries are providing support within III and IV Military Regions. Eighteen of these laundries are providing sewing service for the attachment of name tapes and insignia.

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Saigon, Period Ending 31 July 1970, HQ USARPAC (R2) (U)

(c) The need for flexibility in food service activities, especially with regard to tactical units, makes control of subsistence items a difficult problem. In recent months efforts to control these items have been tightened. Mess personnel have been advised to delete items in excess when submitting requisitions to Class I Ration Breakdown Points. Headcount Officers were appointed to take spot headcounts of personnel served in unit messes. Because these controls proved to be ineffective, all unit dining facilities of this command will be required to account for subsistence by signature headcount. This procedure will guarantee that unit messes will requisition subsistence items for the accurate number of personnel being served in each dining facility.

(3) Retrograde and Disposal

(a) A retrograde regulation (USASUPCOM, SCN Reg No 741-1) was published on 8 July. The regulation encompasses all previous policies and procedures regarding the identification, classification, preparation, shipment, and reporting of retrograde cargo. The Keystone Bluejay operation is closed. There remains, however, items and vehicles turned in under Bluejay that are awaiting shipment out of country to rebuild facilities in PACOM and CONUS. On 20 July the processing locations were opened to receive equipment turned in under the Keystone Robin Project. On 21 July a turn-in of excess equipment and supplies on a "no questions asked" basis was initiated for units in Saigon Support Command. This turn-in of unit excess will be in effect through 31 October.

(b) During the reporting period, the PDO yard at Ho Nai picked up 114,000 STON of scrap metal on their accountable records. This tonnage was picked up as a result of an inventory requested by US Army Property Disposal Agency, Vietnam (P). Until the truck scales were installed at PDO in December 1969, incoming scrap weights were estimated. Since the scales were installed, it became obvious that the incoming scrap weights were underestimated.

(4) Petroleum (a) Construction of the Dong Nai POL Jetty Project, initiated on 24 February 1970, is now 95% complete. The jetty itself is finished as well as the dolphins in front and on the side of it. The earth and crushed rock roadway from the shore end of the jetty to the pump station has been completed. The construction of the welded steel pipeline from the end of the jetty to the pump station remains to be completed. It was determined that the platform on the end of the jetty was not capable of supporting the transfer feeder pumps originally planned to be located there. A small BK barge was obtained for use as a floating pump platform to be anchored next to the jetty's end. This barge will be anchored in place by the Engineers in the near future. The original jetty

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contract called for the construction of a welded, buried pipeline from the jetty pump station to the Long Binh Tank Farm. Due to lack of funds, however, only that part of the pipeline outside Long Binh Post perimeter will be buried. Monsoon rains have made it necessary to postpone construction on this pipeline until 15 September 1970.

(b) Two 10,000-barrel bolted steel tanks located at the Long Binh Tank Farm developed bottom leaks, and had to be taken out of service. Both tanks were drained, flushed with water by the Long Binh Post Fire Department, and cleaned as a self-help project by 29th General Support Group. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to repair one of these tanks with sealing compound and plastic steel. Another attempt, using epoxy sealant, is being made on a self-help basis by the 512th J. Company. This tank will be tested once sealing operations are complete.

(c) Approval was obtained to construct a 4-inch coupled pipeline from the Long Binh Tank Farm to Sanford Army Airfield to supply the three new 500-barrel storage tanks that have been constructed there. This project has not been started due to the immediate requirement for repairing the leaking storage tanks and improving the security around the Dong Nai Barge Site.

(5) During the reporting period, command emphasis was placed on the identification, reporting, and shipping of unit, DSU and GSU Excesses. Simplified procedures were established which encouraged customers to dispose of all excesses through their supporting DSU's. During the period from 12 May 1970 through 31 July 1970, 44,651 lines of excess were reported to USADLS by the several Support Command DSU's for disposition.

(6) Information (a) During this reporting period, this office received notice that Hometown News Releases for arrivals in-country were no longer being accepted by the Army Hometown News Center. Over-all monthly Hometowns submitted dropped to approximately 700 from the previous reporting average of more than 1,000. Command emphasis was placed on obtaining DA Forms 1526 on promotions, achievements and decorations (PADs). During July, the number of PADs was greater than at any other time in the Command's history. Meetings continually were held with subordinate commands so that 1526s from PADs could be increased and thereby offset as much as possible the losses from in-country arrivals. A new program has been established whereby recommendations for awards are accompanied by the 1526.

(b) With the phase-out of 1st Logistical Command Information Office, greater emphasis has been placed on obtaining news releases from Saigon Support Command to publish in outside media. All personnel within the

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Information Office have been assigned monthly quotas to increase the number of news releases submitted. More articles about the command have been published, particularly by the Army Times, Army Reporter, and for the first time, the IACV Observer. Inquiries by civilian correspondents have been more numerous. The resulting stories have all reflected favorably on Saigon Support Command.

(c) The command newspaper, HI-LITE, has been distributed twice monthly. There has been increased emphasis on publishing representative articles written by the information offices of the 4th Transportation Command and the US Army Depot, Long Binh. The office is now in the process of having the paper commercially printed by Stars and Stripes. Approval from USAF already has been given for the project.

(d) A program was initiated during this reporting period of monitoring command information classes throughout the command with a view to increasing their effectiveness and relevancy. This program is continuing.

2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Intelligence. None

c. Operations. Stevedore Strike at Newport and Cat Lai

(1) OBSERVATION: On 24 June all contract stevedore personnel from USAT of Newport and Cat Lai went on strike. USASUPCOM, SCN OPLAN 94-70 was implemented after a 24-hour period had elapsed. During the strike period, operations continued, but at a reduced rate.

(2) EVALUATION: It is essential that the personnel selected to fill positions in the port during strikes have the skills required to continue discharge operations. These individuals must remain in their positions throughout the strike. Daily rotation of individuals reduces the possibility of developing any proficiency through OJT.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Units which are levied for personnel in accordance with USASUPCOM, SCN OPLAN 94-70 should select personnel who can be made available for the duration of the strike.

d. Organization. None

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Saigon, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-45 (R2) (C)

e. Training. None

f. Logistics. (1) Offloading of Beer and Beverages.

(a) OBSERVATION: Shipments of B&B are arriving in the command in quantities beyond the storage capability of the Exchange Depot.

(b) EVALUATION: The problem has been a continuous one. It creates a serious burden upon the transportation system in that the port becomes a storage depot and the clearance system continuously suffers due to slow offload and poor turnaround ratio of port clearance vehicles. For example, during the month of July, Newport received 9,920 STON of B&B. The normal receiving capability at the Exchange Depot is approximately 500 STON per day, however, the Depot was already filled to capacity. Consequently, clearance of the port was extended over a thirty (30) day period.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the movement of B&B into the theater be regulated to coincide with the receiving capability of the Exchange Depot. Furthermore, consideration should be given to increased utilization of Sealand containers rather than general cargo vessels.

(2) Use of Y-Tankers in POL Resupply during Cambodian Offensive.

(a) OBSERVATION: Y-tankers and POL barges have proven efficient for operating in shallow waters for areas where road and fixed wing air resupply of petroleum is impossible.

(b) EVALUATION: Too many transportation and POL assets are tied down by this type of operation where Y-tankers are used as floating storage and tugboats must remain in an isolated area for a long time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That similar methods employed during the Cambodian operations to supply bulk POL in the Delta (IV Military Region) be restricted to those occasions when expediency transcends the economical employment of transportation assets.

(3) Disposition of Unserviceable and Excess Class VII Equipment

(a) OBSERVATION: USANV Msg DTG 091147Z, Jul 70, subject as above, rescinded the authority of maintenance units to provide property book turn-in credit to units.

(b) EVALUATION: The rescission of this authority placed the responsibility for acceptance and retrograde of Class VII at the supply



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DSU level. This added responsibility increases requirements for storage space and transportation. Equipment required for loading heavy equipment, i.e. bulldozers, graders, vehicles, etc., is not organic to supply DSU's. Personnel familiar with the documentation and classification procedures are also not in supply DSU's.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that thru-put of excess or unserviceable Class VII be accomplished to the maximum extent possible with unit transportation assets. The unit representative presents his turn-in document to the DSU. The DSU prepares its turn-in shipping document and sends the unit representative to the turn-in point with the item. The unit representative brings the signed shipping document back to the DSU for his turn-in credit.

(4) Errors in TAMMS reporting.

(a) OBSERVATION: A review of TAMMS (formerly TAEs) forms submitted to higher headquarters indicates improper preparation at the unit level.

(b) EVALUATION: During a 45-day period when this headquarters monitored and surveyed TAMMS forms, more than 500 forms were returned for correction. In nearly every case, reporting errors could have been prevented had the first line supervisor followed the instructions of this and higher headquarters or adhered to the instructions outlined in accordance with the appropriate directives.

4. Communications. None

h. Material. None

i. Other. Hometown News Releases.

(a) OBSERVATION: The exclusion of in-country arrivals has meant a sharp decrease in the over-all Hometown News Release Program. The number obtained through promotions, achievements and decorations has increased.

(b) EVALUATION: Obtaining a Hometown News Release on an arrival was much easier than obtaining them on promotions, achievements and decorations.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That command interest in the Hometown News  
Release Program be continued, and that all cooperation be given the  
program by subordinate commands.

TEL: LBN 2404

2 Incl

~~1. Distinguished Visitors List~~

2. Organizational Chart

Incl 1 w/d HQ DA

*H.B. Gibson, Jr.*

H.B. GIBSON, JR.  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

AVHDD-DO (24 Aug 70) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command,  
Saigon, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) U

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96370 18 JUL 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DI,  
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon.
2. Reference item concerning "Offloading of Beer and Beverages," para 13, paragraph 2f(1). The Vietnam Regional Exchange is conducting a study to determine actions necessary to improve their distribution system. The same problem currently applies to Sealand containers utilized for exchange cargo. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Cliff W. Stevens Jr.*  
Cliff W. Stevens Jr.

Cy furn:  
USASUPCOM-SGN

ASAC: [illegible]

GPOP-DT (24 Aug 70) 2d Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon for  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 6 NOV 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
L.M. OZAKI  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG



UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

## DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R &amp; D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the usual report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL	
3. REPORT TITLE		2b. GROUP	
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon		4	
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)			
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 July 70.			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)			
CG, US Army Support Command, Saigon			
6. REPORT DATE		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
24 Aug 1970		21	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
b. PROJECT NO. N/A		703124	
c.		9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.			
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A		OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			

CONFIDENTIAL

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